In his seminal 1931 paper, Harold Hotelling demonstrates that in a competitive market for a nonrenewable resource, the price of the resource changes at a rate equal to the interest rate, or to the return on capital. This analysis augments and further justifies Hotelling's Rule by demonstrating that it holds within a multisector optimization model with human and physical capital, and with both renewable and non-renewable resources. When consumers and producers engage in optimizing behavior, on the margin the net return to physical capital equals the return to harvesting a renewable resource or extracting a nonrenewable resource. Moreover, this analysis reveals that the alleged inconsistencies of Hotelling's Rule with empirical findings are likely the result of market characteristics specific to each empirical study, not the foundational logic of Hotelling's rule.
Introduction
This analysis demonstrates competitive criteria for market equilibrium when considering renewable or nonrenewable natural resources as factors of production in conjunction with an endogenously derived human capital component.
Production depends upon choosing labor, physical capital, and the resource harvest rate in order to maximize intertemporal profits. As intertemporal utility maximizers, consumers choose both the rates of consumption and human capital accumulation. The consumer owns both the stock of physical capital and the resource stock. Thus, rent from physical capital and revenues from resource extraction are paid to the consumer. In turn, the consumer chooses consumption and time devoted to the accumulation of human capital so as to maximize inter-preted as either renewable or renewable.
This analysis merges endogenous growth literature with that of both renewable and non-renewable resources. The conditions facing the producer and the consumer utilize the perfect foresight competitive approach of Becker [3] , [4] with the dynamic methods of Tahvonen [5] . Technological advancement is represented by the joint accumulation of physical and human capital.
The literature describing the optimal extraction of nonrenewable resources is extensive (Krautkraemer [6] ). Reacting to the energy crisis of the 1970s, earlier studies such as Solow [7] , Dasgupta and Heal [8] , Hartwick [9] , Dixit, Hammond and Hoel [10] , and Dasgupta and Mitra [11] focused primarily on the optimal extraction rate for a nonrenewable resource with exogenous technical progress. Several authors have acknowledged the correlation between growth and resource management. Specifically, Belratti, Chichilnisky and Heal [12] recognize the importance of endogenous growth when analyzing optimal resource extraction. Bretschger [13] describes various "substitution mechanisms" which lead to long run sustainable growth. Using more sophisticated mathematical techniques, Cass and Mitra [14] demonstrate the existence of a perpetual growth steady state under very specific conditions governing the development of technology and the substitutability of physical capital. In his analysis of nonrenewable resource use, Chichilnisky [15] focuses on specific preferences which implicitly define substitutability conditions without explicitly incorporating the dynamics of human capital accumulation. Ulph and Ulph [16] analyze the effect of learning on the optimal abatement of greenhouse gases, thus emphasizing the importance of information when determining optimal environmental policy. Finally, although Clark and Munro [17] and Clark, Clarke and Munro [18] analyze the optimal harvest rate of renewable resources, they do not consider how their optimal harvest rate might be affected if the resource were not a final good, but an input.
Finally, much has been made of the lack of empirical support for Hotelling's Rule. Krautkraemer [6] suggests that this is because the original specification of Hotelling's Rule does not capture technological advancements that lower extraction costs. Detractors cite empirical research indicating that the prices of non-renewable resources have not risen over time as one would expect with continued extraction (Barnett and Morse [19] , Smith [20] ). In particular, Cairn and Davis [21] offer a refutation of Hotelling's rule in an empirical study of gold prices. However, using the same data, Eisenhauer [22] demonstrates empirical results consistent with Hotelling's rule after employing more appropriate econometrics techniques.
Gaudet [23] analyzes US prices for oil, natural gas and a variety of minerals The author finds little evidence that Hotelling's rule is consistent given the variation in prices in these markets. To explain this, Gaudet claims that prices are influenced by several additional factors including extraction costs, market structure, the "durability of the resource" and uncertainty ( [23] , p.1043). In addition, each of these factors varies considerably among resource markets. In his conclusion, the author mentions additional factors he did not consider such as market failure that could also influence price in certain resource markets. Kronenberg [24] states that the failure of Hotelling's rule is due to the limitations of its assumptions. As evidence, he demonstrates that Hotelling's rule does not hold when there is a monopolistic supplier, but shows that the rule still holds within his framework when this condition is relaxed.
In a study of the application of Hotelling's rule to old growth timber, Livernois et al. [25] take care to design an empirical model that more accurately reflects characteristics specific to the old growth lumber market. Though imperfect, they find that this arguably more appropriately tailored model is roughly consistent with Hotelling's rule. They suggest that certain discrepancies should be expected due to short run volatility in general lumber prices and costs; "as the Hotelling rule predicts long run behavior of scarcity rents, the poor fit is perhaps to be expected ( [25] , p. 184)."
The reality is that Cairn and Davis, Gaudet, and Kronenberg address a fun- 
The Consumer Problem
Define ( ) 
η are the present value multipliers of this Hamiltonian system.
The first order conditions for a maximum are given by,
and
Next, differentiate Equations (2) and (3) with respect to time to obtain,
Next, find the costate equations. These are, ( ) 
Equating Equation (4) with (6), and (5) with (7), one sees,
Equating (8) and (9), one obtains the necessary condition for consumer optimization (1). □
The Producer Problem
We assume the producer is an intertemporal profit maximizer. This approach is quite common in both the continuous time models of capital accumulation and the renewable resource models, although this model differs from other renewable resource models in that the resource is a factor of production 1 .
The producer chooses the level of output and the resource extraction rate consistent with intertemporal profit maximization. Production, 
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subject to two dynamic constraints, 
where i(t) is the competitive interest rate in period, t. Proof. Use the methods of optimal control to solve the producer problem. The present value Hamiltonian is,
The control variables for the producer problem are t R and t Y . The corresponding state variables are t X and t K . Thus, the first order conditions for the producer's problem are, 
Also, The first costate equation is,
or,
Combining Equations (14) and (16), and Equations (15) with (17), one obtains the necessary conditions for producer optimization,
Equation (13) use. Equation (13) is a generalization of the optimization condition derived by
Clark [6] . In Clark's renewable resource model, the resource is not a factor of production. A single firm merely harvests and sells the resource. If the cost of harvesting the resource is zero, it follows that total profit is t t q R . Thus, the marginal rate of profit is ˆt q , and Equation (13) 
A Generalization of Hotelling's Rule
A competitive equilibrium is one in which the conditions satisfying the consumer problem (CP) and the producer problem (PP) coincide. Theorem 1. A complete competitive solution requires that the net return to physical capital equal the rate at which effective labor is augmented, as well as the return to the natural resource:
Proof. Combine Equations (8), (9), and (12) to obtain ( )
If one assumes perfect foresight, ( ) (
. Equation (13) provides the right hand side of (18) . □ Therefore, Equation (18) states that, on the margin, the net return to physical capital must equal the rate at which effective labor is augmented (the sum of the rates of population growth and human capital accumulation), as well as the return to harvesting-or extracting-the natural resource. If the resource is nonre- 
This condition is not violated by falling resource prices. In fact, according to this specification, one would expect falling resource prices whenever the marginal product of the resource is decreasing ( ) 0 R F <  .
Conclusions
Harold Hotelling [2] demonstrated that in a competitive market for a nonrenewable resource, the price of the resource changes at a rate equal to the interest rate, or the return on capital. Empirical studies that claim to refute Hotelling's rule focus on market-specific characteristics found only in some resource markets at certain times. In contrast, Hotelling's rule provides the foundation for the determination of non-renewable resource prices, ceteris paribus. Hotelling 
